Problemy wielkich miast

[Stary Pingwin]

Kolega dojeżdża rowerem za 200 z Bródna na Woronicza, nie narzeka. Nas motorniczych nie stać na nic lepszego

[kajo]

Mnie chodzi o coś innego, jak raz Ci ukradną rower to będziesz już zniechęcony do używania go jako środek transportu. Samochód jak ukradną to są szanse odnalezienia ale zniechęcenie także jest, bo kupisz jakiś za 5000zł i też da radę. Roweru nie kupisz za 1/10 ceny. Rower za 300zł to żart nie rower.

Ale za 1000-1500 już jest spoko, może być używany za 600-800. Nadal jesteś 3000 do przodu. Dodatkowo rower się zwraca, zarówno w porównaniu do samochodu, jak i do KM. Jeśli jest ci go tak żal, to możesz nawet go sobie ubezpieczyć, wygrawerować na nim numer itd. a szanse odnalezienia przy takim potraktowaniu są podobne jak przy samochodzie i komórce. Nie przesadzajmy. Znam przypadki odnalezień rowerów. No i jeszcze jedno na korzyść rowerów. Wielka niechęć rowerzystów do kupowania jednośladów z kradzieży. Od gościa ze sklepu z używanymi holendrami wiem, że klienci strasznie często proszą o umowy na taki rower i sprawdzają go na policji. Wiem, że rynek się na to jakiś znajdzie, ale jest to jakiś margines.

[ Dodano: Pon 13 Maj, 2013 23:43 ]
Zapomniałem powtórzyć mantry rowerzystów. Aby ruch rowerowy był coraz większy potrzebne są odpowiednie warunki na drodze (prosta i bezpieczna droga) i stojaki na miejscu docelowym. Resztę ludzie sobie sami jakoś we własnym zakresie zrobią. Zatroszczą się o rower, kupią lepsze zabezpieczenia, itd.

[Ikarusomaniak]

http://wiadomosci.onet.pl/swiat/szwecja ... omosc.html

http://wiadomosci.onet.pl/wideo/brutaln ... 439,w.html

Z artykułu o Sztokholmie można wysnuć wniosek, że rozrabiają Polacy .

[KwZ]

Ten mord w Londynie to zabójstwo, a nie terroryzm.

[Ikarusomaniak]

Ten mord w Londynie to zabójstwo, a nie terroryzm.

Co nie znaczy, że motywy nie mogą być podobne do motywów zamachowców.

[Poc Vocem]

Z artykułu o Sztokholmie można wysnuć wniosek, że rozrabiają Polacy .

Napisać, że muzułmanie przecież nie wolno. Więc zrzuca się winę na swoich, żeby nie wyjść na ksenofobów jakichś...

[Ikarusomaniak]

Zastanawiam się kto kupuje takie bajki? Ludzie na Zachodzie są do urzygu bombardowani polityczną poprawnością, ale musi im się kiedyś włączyć dysonans poznawczy. Albo są bardzo biegli w dwójmyśleniu .

[Bastian]

Jeszcze o sytuacji bankrutującego Detroit:

http://wyborcza.biz/biznes/1,100896,141 ... t_Van.html

[Bastian]

No i stało się, bankructwo ogłoszone:

http://wyborcza.biz/biznes/1,100896,143 ... mbolu.html

[Glonojad]

Tak się kończy inwestowanie w zbiorkom zamiast nowych, ślicznych dróg!

[Bastian]

O Detroit ze strony kartograficzno-statystyczno-historycznej:

http://architizer.com/blog/radical-cartography/

[person]

W latach trzydziestych XX wieku populacja Lipska wynosiła 750 tysięcy mieszkańców, jednak przerwanie tradycyjnych więzów gospodarczych (jedynie Targi Lipskie ratowały część z nich) z Zachodem spowodowało zmniejszenie się przemysłu (poza tekstylnym były to drukarstwo, elektrotechnika i inne), a w konsekwencji spadek liczby mieszkańców do 530 tysięcy, i to w odróżnieniu od innych miast NRD jeszcze w czasach realnego socjalizmu. Po 1990 roku miasto straciło 90 procent miejsc pracy w przemyśle i 20 procent mieszkańców, a kolejne 10 procent uciekło na przedmieścia

Co prawda Lipsk nie jest wielkim miastem, ale historia upadku i opis wyjścia na prostą (którego elementem jest m.in. budowa tunelu średnicowego) są dosyć ciekawe i warte uwagi:
http://www.instytutobywatelski.pl/19986 ... d-upadkiem

[Poc Vocem]

http://turystyka.wp.pl/kat,1036543,titl ... omosc.html - ostateczny koniec Detroit?

[KwZ]

O urbanistyce z zupełnie innej strony. Dla mnie ciekawe i poszerzające.

What happens when a city is managed almost completely by private corporations? Visit Gurgaon, India, a boomtown of millions without a citywide system for water, electricity or even public sewers.

The city of Gurgaon, roughly a half-hour’s drive south of New Delhi, has survived without a functioning municipal government for roughly four decades. If the city of 2 million residents needs to pave a road, or hire police, firefighters or garbage collectors, a patchwork of private companies makes it happen. Or … not.

“It’s a weird place,” says Shruti Rajagopalan, an economist at SUNY Purchase who grew up a short drive away from Gurgaon. She co-authored, with her colleague Alex Tabarrok, a 2014 study of its strange inner workings. “It shouldn’t exist, theoretically.” And yet, the city is a magnet for India’s middle class. The population has swelled by more than 1,600 percent over the past 25 years. “People are just clamoring to move to Gurgaon,” she says. Which raises an intriguing question: Should other cities embrace Gurgaon’s radical experiment in privatization? She explains why, despite its pitfalls, Gurgaon offers a strangely promising blueprint for urban development.

An unplanned city can grow at astonishing speeds. In 1991, India’s legislature passed a raft of economic reforms that opened sectors of the economy to foreign companies. At the time, Gurgaon was an unexceptional town of 121,000 people surrounded by vast tracts of fallow land. By a regulatory quirk, the land around Gurgaon was managed by a single agency, the chief minister’s office in the state of Haryana, versus India’s usual thicket of competing government agencies. It meant that developers’ plans in Gurgaon could be approved in a matter of days, not years. The result? Fast-track approvals for office parks, luxury condominiums, five-star hotels and golf courses. Half of the Fortune 500 companies launched satellite offices in the city’s gleaming high-rises, and it’s home to one of the largest shopping malls in the world. “There are parts of it that look like Singapore or Hong Kong or any world-class city,” says Rajagopalan. But rushing into a bureaucratic void posed a challenge for developers: Who, if not the state, would provide basic public services? “If you ask a regular person, ‘Would you want to live in a city that doesn’t have a functioning sewage system or garbage disposal or a good network of roads,’ they’d probably say no,” says Rajagopalan. So the developers had to convince potential renters to say yes — by filing in the gaps in the city’s sparse public services themselves.

A patchwork of private services emerges, but only within property lines. A mere one-third of Gurgaon’s residents are connected to the city’s main sewage line. Not that the residents of private apartments and offices would notice. “If you’re living inside the development, everything looks great. It looks like you have functional sewage, but those lines are not connected to a main line. They go nowhere.” Instead, the sewage collects in a septic tank at the edge of the property. The building’s owner contracts a tanker truck to ferry the sewage to a dumping ground or river. It’s not ideal, but it’s hardly out of the norm in India. Of the 5,161 cities and towns across India, 4,861 lack even a partial sewage network. So long as Gurgaon’s developers provide superior services compared with other towns in India, the city will keep growing. Gurgaon’s developers can weather shortages in electricity by using diesel-powered generators … which serve only their own properties. They’ve beefed up the city’s 4,000-strong police force with an army of 35,000 private security guards. And one of the city’s largest developers, DLF (originally Delhi Lease and Finance), opened the nation’s first privately owned fire station in 2012. The city’s small public fire station didn’t have hydraulic platforms that could spray water to the top of DLF’s highest towers, so the developer simply purchased two 90-meter platforms for its own state-of-the-art firefighting service.

A dystopian world between privatized compounds. Gurgaon does have some public services; “old Gurgaon,” about 35 sq km in size, is technically a town with a municipal body to manage it. But there are intolerable gaps in the city’s infrastructure. Private security guards may secure the grounds of an apartment or an office complex, but that leaves massive security gaps in the rest of the city. “Between one industrial park and another industrial park are empty areas that are not safe areas at all,” Rajagopalan says. Sewage trucks will frequently bypass treatment plants and dump their contents on public land, and while it poses a health hazard to nearby slums, public officials don’t have the resources to counter such infractions. In short, Gurgaon’s success story is confined to an archipelago of private compounds populated by those who can afford to live there. Look beyond those select properties — and into the city’s slums — and Gurgaon presents an object lesson in the limits of privatization. There, the residents suffer from power and electricity shortages, and the same unsafe and unsanitary conditions that shape daily life for so much of India’s urban poor. The pressing question for them is how a rapidly urbanizing nation will absorb another 404 million residents into its cities by 2050, according to one United Nations estimate, and not suffer a complete breakdown of public services.

One paradoxical solution to Gurgaon’s heedless growth — sell off still more of the city. Rajagopalan offers an unlikely solution to India’s growing pains. Yes, developers show a dismaying lack of civic responsibility beyond property lines. But a funny thing happens as they snatch up larger and larger tracts of land. They develop an incentive to build — and finance — the missing pieces of public infrastructure. “Right now DLF doesn’t find it in its interest to run its own huge sewage system, because it has only four or five small developments,” she says. “It’s not profitable to run to a main sewage line and then treat the waste. But if it had a large enough property, then it would absolutely do it — otherwise no one would live there.”

The private city has a precedent: Walt Disney World. In the 1960s Walt Disney bought up a 25,000-acre wilderness known as the Reedy Creek Improvement District in Florida. Today, you probably know it as Walt Disney World, and Rajagopalan holds it up as an example of what private developers might need to do once they own massive parcels of land. They’ll build every public service imaginable — from roads to power plants to a metro system — in a bid to retain residents. “Disney benefits if people decide to stay in one of the Disney hotels when they visit Disney’s theme park,” she points out — so Disney basically built its own city, though of course sans traditional city perks like citizen participation and social services. “They have their own sewage system, police system, fire system — and everything seems to work completely in the background,” she says. “They are large enough in scale and they’re large enough in terms of profitability that they can have their own systems for each of these problems.” Gurgaon’s developers have the same incentive to serve residents, Rajagapolan suggests — but only if they can unite their scattered developments into a single, city-sized expanse of property. Currently, Gurgaon encompasses 730 square km, large enough to hold seven Disney Worlds — or as Rajagapolan sees it, seven privatized cities competing for residents. It’s a rather fanciful vision of urban development that leaves some troubling questions unanswered. Then again, the same could be said of Gurgaon itself.

I w ogóle polecam TEDy.

[Poc Vocem]

Tekst ciekawy, niemniej sama koncepcja już niezbyt. Pewnie, że takie podejście do urbanistyki jest lepsze niż totalny bałagan w planowaniu (żeby nie nazwać tego brakiem zarządzania), który dominuje w reszcie Indii. W Europie prywatyzacja wszystkiego to spory krok wstecz.

Zresztą w ogóle idea budowy prywatnych miast zalatuje mi neoabsolutyzmem i tworzeniem państwa w państwie. Idea państw-miast zaś zużyła się tysiące lat temu.